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COMMERCIAL LAW RECODIFICATION AND
ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT IN LATIN AMERICA*
BORIS KOZOLCHYK**
In reporting on commercial law recodification in Latin America, I
would have wanted to describe an impressive array of accomplishments,
much as the natural and- especially these days-social scientists report
to their learned Societies. Accordingly, I would have had to refer to how
new Latin American commercial legal institutions, as found in the recently
enacted codes, were going to revolutionize legal theory and practice, there-
by forcing jurists to re-study their commercial law and, more importantly,
bringing about prosperity and economic development to Latin America. I
regret not being able to do this. In fact, I think that a very good case
could be made for the proposition that very little development of true
significance in Latin American commercial law since colonial days can be
attributed to the periodic enactment of "modern" codes or to their partial
equivalents i.e. statutes covering entire fields of commercial law such as
business associations or credit transactions law.
Codification and re-codification of commercial law have been a con-
stant juristic activity in Latin America since colonial days. Even if drafts
were rejected or confined to oblivion by the legislature, the re-drafting
efforts persisted. Ever so often, as in the early 1970's, there came a
period of fruition.' The enormous normative value ascribed to codification
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in Latin America results from the assumptions that the enactment of new
codes, or major segments thereof, is tantamount to legal development and
that legal development either brings about or goes hand in hand with
economic development.2 Underlying these assumptions, rests the belief that
codes, when carefully drawn, are devices for the attainment of utmost legal
certainty, and certainty is the essential prerequisite of the sort of predicta-
bility that encourages economically desirable planning and decision-making
by private and public sectors.
I have recently challenged this assumption by suggesting, in a study
concerning the role of law in the economic development of Costa Rica,3
that the main function of a legal system in bringing about economic devel-
opment is to instill trust in legal institutions. And this trust results not only
from the efficient operation of legal institutions, that is to say, when these
institutions perform predictably and in the least costly manner, but also
from their fairness. Surely there is fairness in the certainty that prompts
good faith reliance in rules or principles of interpretation, as there is
predictability in those rules or principles that embody a community's
standards of fairness. Yet, as it also appeared in this study, when fairness
was ignored by the codifier or when it was subordinated to the satisfactions
of demands for certainty, the effects were detrimental to Costa Rica's
economic development.4
In the field of business associations law, for example, the codifier
decided to heed the demands for greater freedom of action in the creation,
reorganization and liquidation of corporations as formulated by controlling
stockholders of closely held corporations and by their lawyers and account-
ants. Behind these demands, there was a desire to provide greater certainty
in planning the avoidance of corporate, income and estate taxes.5 In heed-
ing these demands, however, the codifier ignored the need for fairer rules
regarding the protection of minority stockholders in publicly held com-
panies, a most important element in the reassurance required for the crea-
tion of an equity securities market in Costa Rica. 6 Consequently, investors
still distrust the equity security investment and the Costa Rican corporation
has remained closely held. Rather than performing the function of attract-
ing "many small contributions . . . from numerous minority stockholders,"
as was desired by the codifiers, 7 the Costa Rican Code of Commerce has
continued to serve as a device for the avoidance of taxation by closely
held corporations through periodic reorganization and decapitalization. 8
Similarly, in the field of credit transactions law, fairness in the treat-
ment of debtors was subordinated to a draconian like certainty in the
enforcement of creditors' rights. Secured and unsecured creditors were
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provided with the means for obtaining their debtors' imprisonment upon
default.9 Yet, while relying upon the threat of imprisonment, the Costa
Rican codifier neglected to develop fair and functional remedies to insure
the repossession and sale of validly acquired security interests. And since
imprisonment for debt is quite an unpopular procedure with judicial and
law enforcement officials (who are also frequently debtors), and also an
impediment to the debtors' ability to repay, the certainty of collection was
far from improved by the recodification of credit transactions law.10 Inter-
est rates in Costa Rica, contrary to what was expected by the codifiers,
failed to come down from pre-1964 levels, despite the large influx of lending
capital as a result of the removal of the prohibition against usurious
lending. 1
One might think that the inability to instill greater fairness in the
codification of commercial law is a phenomenon peculiar only to a given
Latin American country or its draftsmen. This is not so. An examination
of another recent attempt to bring about greater fairness in the corporate
and credit transactions law in Colombia, illustrates some of the problems
that characterize the recodification of commercial law in Latin America.
In contrast with the Costa Rican Code of Commerce, the Colombian
Code of Commerce of 197112 addressed itself to improving a rudimentary,
yet viable, securities' market. Unlike Costa Rica, it is not unusual in Colom-
bia for a person of modest means to own corporate stock in one or more
of Colombia's widely held corporations. The necessary level of liquidity
of corporate stock, undoubtedly an essential element in the reassurance
required by a prospective investor in his first investment decision, seems
to have been attained in Colombia more than a generation ago. 13 Coupled
with liquidity, the possibility of receiving dividends as a steady source of
income has encouraged the acquisition of several corporate stocks in Colom-
bia. In addition, Colombia has had almost a 40-year experience with a
government agency that supervises corporate activity (Superintendencia de
Sociedades An6nimas). 14 This agency has developed numerous guidelines
and has set forth copious rulings on the various aspects of corporate life. 5
Despite the viability of Colombia's securities market, it has become
apparent in the last decade., that the creation of new industries has not
been, as a rule, financed by the issuance of equity securities)16 Equally
significant is that despite the high level of corporate reinvestment, the
increased book values of common stock have not been reflected in their
market price.17 Thus, it is clear, that the Colombian securities market still
lacks the mechanism of reassurance that could bring about even a moderate
level of capital appreciation in most security investments.
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Students of the Colombian corporate legal reality have no difficulty
in identifying abusive practices developed under the preceding corporate
statutory law. These practices were meant to bring about and take advan-
tage of the absence of capital appreciation in the securities market. By
artificially depressing the value of corporate stock, for example, certain
groups of stockholders have managed either to gain or retain control of
large corporations. Prominent among such practices is the failure to declare
dividends during one or more fiscal periods by exercising powers allegedly
delegated to the board of directors through the uncurbed solicitation of
voting proxies or by the creation of artifically high earned and retained
surplus accounts.18
Faced with such abusive practices, the draftsmen of the Code of
Commerce decided inter alia to impose in Article 155 a mandatory divi.
dend declaration per fiscal year of 50%o of the corporation's net profits. 19
Under certain circumstances, this mandatory rate could go up to as high
as 75% of the net profit.20 The Code proceeded to insure the feasibility
of the dividend distribution by setting up a special fund and also by
providing the minority stockholder with a specific action in the event of
an unjustified lack of distribution.2' At the same time, however, the Code
provided that 70% of the stocks represented in the shareholders meeting
deciding on dividend distribution could ignore the mandatory distribution
rule.22
Article 155 of the Colombian Code of Commerce can, therefore, be
regarded as an attempt to bring about fairness in the area of dividend
distribution by providing mechanisms to insure the certainty of dividend
declaration. Nevertheless, the Code, by committing the corporation to a
rigid and arbitrary rate of continuous dividend payments and thus decapi-
talization precludes reinvestments that could easily raise the level of future
distributions. At the same time, however, it sanctions the continued perpe.
tration of unfairness toward minority stockholders by allowing 70% of
the voting stock present at the meeting, regardless of cause or justification,
to block a proposed and perhaps highly advisable distribution. Given the
propensity by many controlling groups of stockholders to take advantage
of loopholes in the regulation of voting mechanisms in order to impose the
dividend policy most favorable to their interests, it is predictable that such
policies will continue in effect despite the 70% vote required by the pres-
ent code.
In evaluating the wisdom as well as the fairness of Article 155 of the
Colombian Code of Commerce it should be kept in mind, that the lack of
capital gain from an investment in equity securities is detrimental to the
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interests of majority and minority stockholders alike. The only stockholder
who stands to profit from lower market prices is one who wishes to pur-
chase shares as part of a plan to acquire higher control. Thus, even the
stockholder who may wish to manipulate market prices in order to facili-
tate his acquisition would only want to do so for a limited period of time,
because continued lower prices would only reduce his ultimate profits.
Nevertheless, the Code has singled out the behavior typical of a manipulator
of market prices when engaged in his manipulation as the model for the
rule that governs dividend distribution by manipulators and non-manipu-
lators alike. It should also be noted that despite the vast experience accumu-
lated by the Colombian Saperintendencia de Sociedades Andnimoas with
abusive distribution practices, the Code of Commerce did not turn to this
agency for ad hoc determinations on the advisability of dividends. A dele-
gation that would have allowed development of adjudicative criteria based
upon models of behavior consistent with the goal of greater capital appreci-
ation for investments in equity securities.
In the field of credit transactions, and particularly in negotiable
instruments law, the Colombian codifier, as his Costa Rican counterpart,
pursued a policy of maximizing the certainty of collection by protecting
the rights of creditors-holders of negotiable instruments.23 He also recog-
nized, however, the need to qualify the rights of holders of negotiable
instruments, lest creditor protection become the correlative of debtor in-
equity. Accordingly, the minority and the incapacity of the signer or the
fraudulent nature of the transaction were listed among the defenses avail-
able against the holder.24 In doing this, the Colombian codifier was merely
restating pre-existing law. 23 But under the preceding regulation it was not
clear whether those who acquired commercial paper with knowledge of an
insufficiency or inadequacy of consideration in the underlying transaction
were immune to such defenses by being deemed holders in due course. If
the transferees were deemed entitled to such a characterization as a matter
of course, this would definitely encourage sharp practices among install-
ment sellers and moneylenders. By simply transferring the instruments,
unscrupulous merchants would prevent signers from raising the above
mentioned defenses in the expeditious procedures used in the collection of
negotiable instruments. Forced to pay on their negotiable instruments debts,
the buyer's or borrower's only recourse would be to bring lengthy and
costly breach of contract actions against their sellers or lenders. What was
missing under pre-existing law, therefore, was a standard or a set of guide-
lines to help evaluate the extent of a holder's knowledge concerning the
underlying transaction that could compromise his presumed good faith.26
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The Codifier of the 1971 Code of Commerce did not provide a stand-
ard or guidelines on what is deemed good faith in the acquisition of
negotiable instruments. Indirectly one may infer from the provisions refer-
ring to bad faith that unless the holder was aware of his transferor's lack
of ownership of the instrument by its having been stolen, embezzled, forged
or filled without the signer's authority, the presumption of good faith would
apply and the holder would be deemed in due course.2 7
Consequently, a party who purchases commercial paper knowing that
the drawer or acceptor did not intend to create a negotiable instrument
could conceivably still be immune to such a defense because, while the
Code requires delivery of the instrument with the intent that it be negoti-
able, it also presumes such an intent from the fact that it is in the hands
of someone other than the signer.28 Furthermore, the Code expressly pre-
cludes raising the defense of lack of intent to create a negotiable instrument
against one deemed a holder in good faith, someone who, as we have just
seen, only has to prove a valid title of acquisition.
This state of the law seems very convenient to Colombian creditors
as it is also clearly inequitable to the victims of sharp practices and uncon-
scionability by creditors. Yet it may be predicted that in Colombia, as in
Costa Rica, the cost of credit will not be lowered by the initial certainty
of collection based upon one-sided remedies. As proven by the Costa Rican
experience, the unfairness of the system prompts an adverse reaction by
debtors that leads to greater uncertainty and ultimately to higher costs of
collection.2 9
At this point, one might be tempted to object, and perhaps with good
reason, that the codifier is not the party best suited for the establishment
of standards in areas such as good faith in the distribution of dividends or
in the acquisition of negotiable instruments. For where such guidelines are
available, they usually have been the result of a case by case determination
by courts of analysis by doctrinal writings. 30 Yet, where neither courts nor
doctrinal writers have attempted to supply such guidelines, or where the
codifier has ignored whatever guidelines existed in decisional and doctrinal
law, as has happened in Costa Rica, Colombia and other Latin American
countries, the method, purpose and scope of codification must be re-evalu.
ated.
It is noteworthy that, as a rule, Latin American code draftsmen do not
evaluate existing and future statutory law in light of national or regional
decisional law trends. The comparison that permits an evaluation is usually
provided by what is stated in other codes, especially recent European
enactments, and in scholarly treatises. Commercial law practice is taken
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into consideration but usually only from the standpoint of a given group
interested in the enactment of specific rules that may affect its business
or lines of work. Thus if there is an expression of interest in a certain rule
by a group of bankers, corporate counsel or accountants, the opinion of
other parties likely to be affected by the proposed rules are only taken into
account if they coincide with the views held by the codifiers themselves.
There is an absence in the Latin American codifying process of what I
described elsewhere as the "conflictive advocacy" of fair lawmaking." It
may well be argued that codification is illsuited for the method of conflic-
tive advocacy, particularly since the number of rules that would be subject
to intensive debate would be so numerous that the costs would be prohibi.
tive. Thus, the argument would run, codification must sacrifice popular
participation in drafting in favor of technical legal skills indispensable in
the formulation of code rules. The question remains, however, whether code
rules or their drafting method, as conceived in Latin America, are incon-
sistent with the goal of attaining greater fairness in the regulation of the
various institutions.
In preparing his draft, the Latin American codifier first of all feels
an obligation to conform to the standards of what is generally referred
to as "legal science." Legal science requires that the concepts used in a
code be, above all, logically sound and consistent. This attitude is respon-
sible for what could be described as a McLuhanesque phenomenon: the
manner in which rules are expressed, or the normative "media," if you
will, becomes the message. The style of expression, almost imperceptibly
becomes the normative guideline or the rule itself. This metamorphosis
usually starts with the attempt to define the various institutions subject to
code regulation, a task undertaken by most self-respecting code draftsmen
prior to working on the text of the actual rules. In trying to arrive at a
valid definition, in a neo-Aristotelian fashion, 32 the codifier asks himself,
what is the essence of the institution in question; is, say, a negotiable
instrument a contract or a unilateral act? ; or is it perhaps a multilateral
transaction?; is the creation of a corporation a contract?, and if it is a
contract, is it, in turn, "formal" or "real," unilateral or bilateral and so
on. What the codifier forgets is that these apparently essential elements
or categories of the "being" of commercial legal institutions are nothing
but inter-dependent concepts, mere linguistic utensils of the definitional
mechanism characteristic of pure or abstract reason. In other words, there
is nothing truly essential in a determination that concludes that a negoti-
able instrument is a unilateral act or that a corporation is a multilateral
transaction. In fact, all such definitions are in a large measure tautological
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and, to the extent that they ignore the empirical legal reality upon which
they are supposed to be based, they are also normatively ineffective.33
Once he has committed himself to a given definition, however, the
codifier frequently feels that he has no choice but to follow through by
adopting whatever are its "logical" consequences. The results are fre-
quently unjust and downright paradoxical if one expects to find an enact-
ment of a codifier's avowed social policy. Thus, a draftsman who
sincerely professes to be a defender of the poor and under-privileged, could
easily end up adopting a rule that will operate injustice against poor buyers
and borrowers because of a "legal science" dictate. This is illustrated by
the rule that sets forth the time at which a negotiable instrument is deemed
binding on its signer in the recent draft of a Uniform Negotiable Instru-
ments Law for Latin America. 34 This project adopts a widely accepted
definition of a negotiable instrument advanced by Cesar Vivante, a dis.
tinguished Italian Commercial Law Professor of the turn of the century:
"Negotiable instruments are the documents necessary for the exercise of
the literal and autonomous rights therein set forth."35 And in furtherance
of a conceptual symmetry that assertedly requires the bindingness of form
in negotiable instruments law, much weight is placed by the Project's
draftsmen and by most draftsmen of recent commercial codes who adopted
the Vivante definition, upon the act of signing the instrument bearing the
prescribed form. More weight is given to it, in fact, than to the true
intention to create a negotiable instrument evidenced not only by its
signature but also by its delivery to an intended holder.36 In doing this,
however, the draftsmen either overlooked or felt they had no choice but
to ignore the fact that the parties more apt to take advantage of the rule
are those who make it their business to procure signatures on negotiable
instruments for the purpose of collecting otherwise uncollectable or diffi-
cult to collect debts. Similarly in corporate law, another field of com-
mercial code regulation in Latin America, the codifier implements the
asserted conceptual analogy between a shareholders meeting and a de-
mocracy by vesting almost absolute powers on the meeting. The fact that
working majorities could be easily manipulated by controlling groups to
bring about most undemocratic results is again either ignored or set aside.
In sum, one is led to conclude that the method of recodification of
commercial law in Latin America has either sacrificed fairness to the
certainty embodied in what is regarded as conceptual symmetry, or has
been unable to provide valid standards in areas where it attempted to. I
shall now turn to the purpose and scope of commercial law re-codification.
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If it is agreed that the main function of a legal system in bringing
about economic development is to instill trust in legal institutions then,
clearly, the purpose of commercial law codification is to bring about the
requisite amount of trust in its regulation of commercial transactions. We
have just seen, however, how failure to contribute valid standards of fair-
ness impedes greater reliance on commercial legal institutions in Latin
American societies. We have also questioned whether the codifier is the
party best suited to set forth these standards. Furthermore, it is obvious
that if there is widespread distrust among the participants in commercial
transactions, the amount of reassurance required from legal institutions
will be enormous, and beyond a given point, possibly ineffective. As put
to me once by an experienced banker: "If a customer wants me to issue
a letter of credit because he is afraid of his own shadow, I would be well-
advised to reject his application, no amount of assurance is ever going to
satisfy him. . . ." Similarly, if it is a widespread attitude toward the law
and legal institutions that "whoever invented the law also invented the
way to get around it," then it can be expected that the law will only be
able to induce desirable behavior by providing palatable incentives for
obedience. And as the cost of these incentives mounts, the state may
well find its normative function too expensive to undertake seriously. In
essence, what I am suggesting is that an effective normative function by
codification or other methods not only must instill trust but also depends
upon its presence among the participants in the commercial and legal
relationship.
Having lived and worked in Latin America for half of my life, I feel
safe in saying that, possibly as a result of the generalized dislike for mer-
cantile activities in pre-colonial and colonial Spanish civilization, 37 His-
panic Americans, by and large, are still quite distrustful of each other in
commercial transactions. Moreover, I believe that empirical studies could
bear out the hypothesis that a substantial number of Latin Americans, when
approaching a commercial transaction, and the law that applies to it, be-
have in a fashion described by the 16th Spanish "picaresque" literature:
For one party to win or to profit, the other party must be a loser, possibly
by having been outwitted.38 This view of mercantile man occasionally
determines a legislative language, which assumes trickery as the most
likely behavior. Thus, Article 155 of the Colombian Code of Commerce
assumes that corporate dividend policy is necessarily the result of an at-
tempt to manipulate an acquisition of securities. It also prevents other
institutions from being tested even though in theory it appears that they
could operate at a lesser cost than that of the instituion in force. For ex-
ample, to this day, no commercial codifier in Latin America would allow
the private foreclosure by sale set forth in Section 9-504 of the U.C.C. 9 as
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an alternative to the cumbersome and costly judicial sale. As put to me by
one South American code draftsman: " . . . to allow the creditor to repos.
sess and resell privately the chattel would be virtually to wipe out any
hope of the debtor's recovery of his equity of redemption. It would be as
if we would give to the thief the key to the very premises he intended to
steal from ..
I hasten to add, lest I be accused of mouthing "racist" or Anglo-Amer.
ican supremacy homilies, that the distrust I have found in commercial
transactions contrasts sharply with the trust placed upon each other by
Latin Americans when acting as friends. Indeed, I am convinced that
friendship in Latin America implies a much deeper and genuine com-
mitment than the one I have observed among Anglo-American business
or professional associates. However, the very size of industrial market
settings, the large number of participants and volume of transactions pre-
vents friendship from acting as a significant reassuring element. An
industrial market presupposes an "impersonal" nature for most of its
commercial transactions. Under these circumstances, an overall model or
standard of commercial behavior other than the picaresque one must shape
the determination of rights and duties. Merchants and their customers,
corporate directors and shareholders must be able to assume that one
party's profits are not necessarily inconsistent with the other's, and that
in fact, one of the best ways to insure continued profitability is by assur-
ing that both parties to the bargain could profit from it.
Obviously it would be illusory to assume that the law, by itself, can
induce a more trusting archetypal behavior in commercial transactions.
Ingrained social attitudes can only be changed after a long and fre-
quently painful educational process. Nevertheless, tile law plays an
essential role in this process by providing standards of fairness con-
sistent with the desirable model of behavior.
These are the standards that should allow judges, lawyers, law pro-
fessors and students to evaluate mercantile conduct and even without ex-
press reference to statutory, decisional or doctrinal authority be able to
express an intelligent opinion on whether the conduct in question "sounds"
or does not sound "right," or, better still, whether it is "reasonable" or "in
good faith." The standards should not only influence official lawmaking
but also the law made by contracting parties themselves, many of whom in
Latin America still feel that only an obligation that is fully spelled out
could be binding on the obligor; an attitude which ignores the fact that
many obligations and particularly, those which require the exercise of
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discretion by the obligor are only susceptible of being described in terms
such as "reasonable" or "in good faith".
Far from being abstract formulations of behavior, the standards of
fairness therefore must be based upon an "adjudicative" reality, that is to
say they must grow out of actual or potential conflicts of rights, interests
or "de facto claims", and therefore must involve serious enough disputes.
Mere differences of opinion on the actual facts or vague declarations of
principle are not the stuff of which these standards are made. In addition,
the standards must be consistent with what was described elsewhere as
"guiding" institutions of a legal system. Thus, "it is implicit in a legal
system whose participants distinguish between, on the one hand, a contract
of sale, or a loan performed in good faith and, on the other hand, an
illicit act of obtaining money under false pretenses, that one sidedness in
the right to exact the other party's performance is unfair. The mere fact
that the participants choose to call their relationship a contract cannot be
ignored when evaluating its fairness".40
Consequently, it becomes clear that courts and other adjudicative
bodies, regardless of whether the jurisdiction is civil or common law
oriented, are in the best position and therefore have an ongoing responsi-
bility for the elaboration of the standards of fairness necessary for the
adjustment of commercial legal institutions to the desirable behavior. It is
also clear that in civil law jurisdictions where the elaboration of rules of
general binding effect is almost exclusively a legislative function, the
legislature must, from time to time, incorporate these standards to the
statutory complex, and either abrogate inconsistent institutions or else
supplement those in the codes or statute books. It may also have to intro-
duce totally new institutions and either set forth or allow for the elabora-
tion of related standards by decisional law. Yet if this creative and correc-
tive process is to be meaningful, it must be pinpointed; wholesale abroga-
tion and replacement, or massive introduction of new institutions as usually
done by re-codification carries a very high price tag in terms of the
adjudicative and compliance functions of the system. In the first place,
many of the standards elaborated in relation to preceding institutions
and predicated upon a certain conceptual and textual basis would have
to be discarded, even though the mercantile activities involved remained
the same.
Secondly, the import of "exotic" institutions on the sole basis of their
success in a foreign jurisdiction or their doctrinal acceptability, if not
coupled with an actual need for such institutions only results in a dis-
torted or pathological use. The imported institution is adapted to serve as
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a device with which to circumvent prohibitions applicable to the insti-
tutions in actual use thereby diminishing if not destroying, the effectiveness
of the prohibition.41 Finally, the ever present possibility of re-codification
encourages a judicial attitude of literal and unimaginative interpretation
of existing statutory rules, because "if the law is not what it literally says
it is, let the legislature say so". Accordingly, courts rationalize their un-
willingness to be more equitable and creative in their interpretation of
statutory law.
In light of these considerations, it appears that the scope of re-codifi-
cation is much more limited than what it is widely perceived to be in
Latin America. I would like to submit in conclusion, that much is to be
gained in the fairness and efficiency of Latin American commercial law
if the resources invested in the periodic re-drafting of commercial codes
were applied to the creative interpretation and careful revision of the
existing ones.
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236-240, especially tables 13-16 (CEMLA, Mexico, 1966), see also CEMLA REUNIO-
NES, Los Mercados de Capitales en Amirica Latina, 184-193 (Mfxico, 1966). For
monographic studies on the Colombian capital market, see A. Basch, M. Kybal, El
Mercado de Capitales en Colombia (CEMLA, Mexico, 1969). In contrast with the
Costa Rican Corporation whose average number of shareholders is a handful or less
and whose widely held stock company has less than 2,000 shareholders, in Colombia
there are more than 10 stock companies with more than 5,000 stockholders each. For
statistics on the numbers of per company shareholders in Colombia, see XXII Revista
Superintendencia de Sociedades Andnimas, 96-113, n.38 (Diciembre, 1966).
14 See, Ley 58 de 23 de Abril de 1931 which came into effect on September 1,
1937, in J. Ortega y Torres, C6digo de Comercio Terrestre, 491 (Bogoti, 1969).
t 5On the functions of the Superintendencia de Sociedades An6nimas see, for
example, V Revista de Superintendencia de Sociedades Andnimas, 96 n.1 7 (Abril,
1949) and X Revista de Superintendencia de Sociedades An6nimas, 256 n.24 (1955).
16 See Departmento Nacional de Planeaeidn, Planes y Programs de Desarrollo,
1969-72, pp. 1.17-1.24, Tables n.15, 16, 17, and 18, (Documento, DN P-417, Bogotd,
1969), and also, W. Prendergast, Jr., and J. Franco Holguin, Report (unpublished
report of October 31, 1969, on file with University of Arizona Law Library), Corpora-
clones Financieras of Colombia at 8 and 9 which points out that during the period
1964-68 private investment decreased from 80% to 70% in proportion to total invest-
ment, while public investment increased from 16% to 30%. According to this study,
for each peso invested in new industrial projects, nearly 5 pesos have been utilized
for capital increases of existing industries. This meant that the industrial sector,
potentially the most dynamic in the economy, has developed relatively few new ven-
tures. The consequences, according to this report, are reflected in high unemployment.
t In the 10-year period 1953-62, despite a declining rate of distribution of divi-
dends which corresponded to an increase in corporate reinvestments, there was no
significant increase in the stock market price of many of Colombia's "blue chips,"
particularly in the fields of textiles and food (chocolate production). This is apparent
by comparing the table on rates of dividend distribution in XVlII Revista de Super-
intendencia de Sociedades An6nimas, 10 n.34 (Agosto, 1962) with annual tables-
indexes on prices for shares of Colombia's industrial companies, as for example, in
the same Revista at 132.
IsSee M. Prieto, Superintendencia de Sociedades Andnimas Memorandum do
Septiembre 7, 1970, a J. Valencia Jaramillo, Minister of Economics and Development
and M. Escobar Mendez, Minister of Justice at 4-6 (on file with the University of
Arizona College of Law Library, Foreign Law Collection), see also Gabino Pinzdn,
Las Sociedades en el Nuevo Cddigo de Comercio, Revista de la Cdmara de Comercio
de Bogota 45 at 51 (No. 3, Junio de 1971). For incomplete, but nevertheless, quite
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telling statistics on the distribution of dividends and reinvestment practices in Colom-
bia's corporations see, XIX Revista de Superintendencia de Sociedades An6nimas
28-29, Tables 11 and 12 (n.35, 1963), see also same Revista, Vol. XX, p. 32, Table
13 (n.36, 1964).
t5 Article 155 of the Code of Commerce reads in part as follows: "Except when
decided differently by 70% of the shares of stock represented in the shareholders
meeting . . . corporations shall distribute no less than 50% of their net profits in
each fiscal year . . . " No reasons were given in any of the commentaries to the
drafts of what eventually became article 155 for the specific rates of distribution
chosen; interestingly, Article 166 of the pre-final draft set forth a 40% mandatory
distribution (see M. Prieto, Memo, supra n.17 at 4-5). Also of interest is that the
rule in question survived various revisions by jurists of varying ideology virtually
unscathed, see W. Villa Uribe, J. L. Narvaez, S. Finkielsztein, H. Tapias Rocha,
C6digo de Comercio (Terrestre) Titulo Preliminar, Libros Primero y Segundo, Arts.
65 and 319 (undated, on file at the University of Arizona College of Law Library).
The only published criticism available to this writer on the future text of Article 155
was a terse statement by the National Association of Manufacturers (Asociaci6n
Nacional de Industriales) in a memorandum addressed to "Comisi6n Revisora del
Proyecto de C6digo de Comercio" (September, 1970) reprinted without date by the
Superintendencia de Sociedades. Addressing itself to former article 42 of the pre-
final draft of the Code of Commerce (present Article 155), the Association stated
in p. 14 and 15 of the Memorandum: ". . . The principle of a minimum dividend
distribution is subject to criticism. On the one hand, it goes against the need for
higher savings experienced by the national economy. On the other hand, it ignores
the problems of financial management posed by the distribution of dividends. The
protection of minority stockholders may be obtained by other devices not as harm-
ful (to the corporation) as this one." (My translation and parenthesis).
20See Articles 155 and 454 of the Colombian Code of Commerce.
2 tSee Articles 154, 156, and 451 to 456, of the Colombian Code of Commerce.
22See Article 155 of the Colombian Code of Commerce.
2 3See generally, Robledo Uribe, Los Titulos Valores En el Nuevo C6digo de
Comercio, 3 Revista Cimara de Comercio de Bogoti 75 at 79 (June, 1971) and Perez
Vives, Los Titulos Valores en el Nuevo Cbdigo de Comercio, 3 Revista Cmara de
Comercio de Bogot, 81 (June, 1971); for a more detailed discussion of some of the
theories influential on the draftsmen, see Londono Hoyos, Titulos Valores en el Nuevo
C6digo de Comercio, 4 Revista de Cimara de Comercio de Bogoti, 93-105 (Sep-
tember, 1971).
24See Article 784 (2) of the Code of Commerce.
2 5See Article 57 of the Ley 46 de 1923 (virtually a literal translation of the
United States Negotiable Instruments Act) in Ortega Torres, supra n.14 at 422.
26Article 55 of the Ley 46 of 1923 required from the holder in due course
(tenedor en debida forma) inter alia that he receive the instrument in good faith
and for value. Article 61 of this law set forth a rebuttable presumption of good faith
in the holder's favor. This presumption ceased to operate if, in accordance with
Article 57 the holder "obtained the instrument or some of its signatures by fraud,
duress or coercion or by any other illegal means or when he negotiates in bad faith
or in circumstances that amount to fraud." (My translation.) Professor Rengifo's
research of Colombia's Supreme Court decisions rendered during the last 40 years has
failed to discern any consistent guidelines on what was deemed a bad faith acquisition
under the Ley 46 of 1923. Even the most basic questions such as is the holder
deemed not to have acquired in good faith if he failed to pay value for the instru-
ment, have not received a clear cut resolution by the Supreme Court.
27See Articles 784 (11) and (12) and 622 a contrario, Article 820 allows an
action to recover the instrument against anyone not a diligent bolder in good faith
thus suggesting that lack of diligence may in certain cases, be deemed tantamount to
bad faith, or at least to absence of good faith. Professor Rengifo in Titulos Valores,
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Texto y Materiales de Estudio el Tenedor en Debida Forma 24 (1972) (on file in
the University of Arizona College of Law Library) subscribes to the title of acquisi-
tion test for the determination of bad faith in the 1971 Code of Commerce.
28See Article 625 of the Code of Commerce. A legislative intent may be inferred
from the rule on a signature by an accommodation party whose accommodation is
known to a holder and who is unable to allege such knowledge as a defense against
"any holder who has paid value for the instrument." On this, see Article 639 of the
Code of Commerce.
2 9See, Kozolchyk, 729-734.
30For a brief description of the various European and Latin American doctrinal
views on the meaning of good and bad faith in the acquisition of negotiable instru-
ments and on its legislative formulation with a view toward uniformity, see S. D.
Bergel, La Exceptio Dolis Generalis en la Ley Cambiaria, Revista del Derecho
Comercial y de las Obligaciones, Aio 1, n.1-6, p. 785, 787-800 (Buenos Aires, 1968).
For a brief account of the elaboration of standards of good faith of acquisition in
Anglo-American law, see W. E. Britton, Bills and Notes, 244-300 (St. Paul, 1961).
3t Kozolchyk, 698, 701, 714 and 736.
32 Aristotle describes a definition as "a phrase signifying a thing's essence." An
essential characteristic, in turn, is one which "is not predicated on a subject other
than itself," see The Basic Works of Aristotle 191, 691-94 (McKeon edition, undated).
33For the influence of scholastic conceptualism and particularly on the use of
definitions and classification on Latin American legal education and thought, see
Kozolchyk at 751-52.
34 See INTAL, Proyecto de Ley Uniforme de Titulos Valores para America
Latina 20, (Buenos Aires, 1967). Articles 7 and 9 of this article may be translated
in part as follows: "Any negotiable instrument obligation stems from a signature
placed in the negotiable instrument and ... the signer of a negotiable instrument will
be bound in the literal terms of the instrument, even though the instrument gains
circulation against his will or after his death or incapacity."
35See Article I of the Draft, op. cit., supra n.34 at 19; see also C. Vivante, III
Tratado de Derecho Mercantil 136 (Spanish translation, Madrid, 1936).
36See C. Vivante, op. cit., supra n.35 at 146 where he asserts that the obligation
assumed by the signer of a negotiable instrument is more serious than the one as-
sumed by the signer of non-commercial (civil or common) paper and bases this asser-
tion on the reliance that must be induced by negotiable instruments. In this respect,
compare Guatemalan Code of Commerce Article 393 which following the Draft rule
states that "the signer of a negotiable instrument remains bound by it even: though
the instrument gained circulation against his will . . ." with the Colombian Code of
Commerce Article 625 which states: ". .- negotiable instruments are binding upon
their signature and delivery with the intention that they become negotiable. When
the instrument is in the hands of a person other than the signer, such delivery is
presumed. ."
57Americo Castro, one of the foremost students of Spanish civilization, attributes
the disrepute of intellectual and mercantile activities among Spaniards since the 15th
Century to the fear of being identified as descendants from Jews or Moors: "As I
have elsewhere shown with abundant evidence, from the end of the 15th Century on,
it was considered dishonorable to be descended from Jews or Moon . . ."; and
"... The Christian was interested in maintaining his 'honor,' in being a hidalgo ...
Moors had betrayed their inferiority by being conquered, and Jews excelled in a
type of activity that, seen from below, seemed nothing but oppressive usury and
exaction of taxes, from which hidalgos were exempt. . . ." See Castro, The Spanish
People, The Texas Quarterly, Spec. Issue, The Image of Spain at 4 and 10 (Spring-
Summer, 1961), see also A. Castro, La Realidad Hist6rica de Espafia 472-484 (Mexico,
1954).
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3tThis type of behavior is exemplified at the sheer subsistence level of trade by
the exploits of El Lazarillo do Tormes, a Spanish anonymous novel (c. 1554).
39Uniform Commercial Code, Section 9-504:
"SECURED PARTY'S RIGHT TO DISPOSE OF COLLATERAL AFTER DE-
FAULT; EFFECT ON DISPOSITION.
(1) A secured party after default may sell, lease or otherwise dispose of any or all
of the collateral in its then condition or following any commercially reasonable
preparation or processing. Any sale of goods is subject to the Article on Sales (Arti-
cle 2). The proceeds of disposition shall be applied in the order following to
(a) the reasonable expenses of retaking, holding preparing for sale, selling and
the like and, to the extent provided for in the agreement and not prohibited
by law, the reasonable attorneys' fees and legal expenses incurred by the
secured party;
(b) the satisfaction of indebtedness secured by the security interest under which
the disposition is made;
(c) the satisfaction of indebtedness secured by any subordinate security interest
in the collateral if written notification of demand therefor is received before
distribution of the proceeds is completed. If requested by the secured party,
the holder of a subordinate security interest must seasonably furnish rea-
sonable proof of his interest, and unless he does so, the secured party need
not comply with his demand.
(2) If the security interest secures an indebtedness, the secured party must account
to the debtor for any surplus, and, unless otherwise agreed, the debtor is liable for
any deficiency. But if the underlying transaction was a sale of accounts, contract
rights, or chattel paper, the debtor is entitled to any surplus or is liable for any
deficiency only if the security agreement so provides.
(3) Disposition of the collateral may be by public or private proceedings and may
be made by way of one or more contracts. Sale or other disposition may be as a
unit or in parcels and at any time and place and on any terms but every aspect of
the disposition including the method, manner, time, place and terms must be com-
mercially reasonable. Unless collateral is perishable or threatens to decline speedily
in value or is of a type customarily sold on a recognized market, reasonable notifica-
tion of the time and place of any public sale or reasonable notification of the time
after which any private sale or other intended disposition is to be made shall be
sent by the secured party to the debtor, and except in the case of consumer goods
to any other person who has a security interest in the collateral and who has duly
filed a financing statement indexed in the name of the debtor in this state or who
is known by the secured party to have a security interest in the collateral. The
secured party may buy at any public sale and if the collateral is of a type customar-
ily sold in a recognized market or is of a type which is the subject of widely
distributed standard price quotations he may buy at private sale." Please note
the crucial role of concepts such as "commercially reasonable" and "reasonable
notification" in the determination of the legality and fairness of this remedy and
the interplay between these concepts and what is customary in trade. See, Uniform
Commercial Code Sections 1-203 and 1-205(2).
4 0See Kozolchyk, at 741.
4 tCircumvention of the law and particularly of prohibitions through the use of
"simulations," that is, by providing the appearance of entering into a permissible
act or contract when in fact the parties are entering into another one that is illegal,
is a widespread practice in Latin America, see Kozolchyk, Law and Credit Structure
in Latin America 7 Va. Journal of International Law, n.2 at 11, 12, 33, 34 (1967).Rosenn, The Jeito, Brazil's Institutional Bypass of the Formal Legal System and its
Development Implications, 19 American Journal of Comparative Law 514 (1971).
These simulations are greatly facilitated by the availability of idle and amorphous
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institutions, i.e., acts or contracts which have no direct bearing on prevailing commer-
cial practices and which therefore can be adapted to serve as mere covers for the for-
bidden transactions. A case in point is that of the so-called reporto contract found
in many of the recent Latin American re-codifications of commercial law. Originally
an equivalent of what in Anglo-American law would be the "short" sale, it is now
being used to circumvent prohibitions on the control of corporations by given share-
holders or by holders of certain classes of shares. For the cost of simulation in the
economic development process, see Kozolchyk, 744.
